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1. Introduction
In everyday communication, positive messages are favored over negative 
ones (Tesser and Rosen, 1975), because they can help avoid appearing callous 
(Goffman, 1959) or project positive images of ourselves (Kardes et al., 1982). 
This natural inclination, however, often puts us in a dilemma that Bavelas, et 
al., (1990) referred to as Avoidance-Avoidance Conflict (AAC). In AAC 
situations, conversational demand (Dascal, 1983) leaves you no choice other 
than producing a message that leads to a negative consequence; producing a 
positive message instead in such a situation would result in a serious 
violation of the cooperative principle (CP), especially the quality maxim (Grice, 
1975), as it semantically or pragmatically falsifies the information conveyed. 
Consider the following example as an illustration:
(1) (B received a gift from A, a good friend of B, but did not like it at all.)
 A:  Did you like the gift?
 B:  a.  I don’t like it.
  b.  I loved it!
 (Bavelas, et al. 1990)
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(1a) is an honest but negative message in that it can cause an interpersonally 
undesired consequence (e.g., face-threat), whereas (1b) is a positive but baldly 
falsifying message that violates the quality maxim of the CP. Thus, you are 
caught in the middle, at least theoretically, between the Principle of 
Politeness (Leech, 1983; Brown and Levinson, 1987) and the CP.
Practically, when caught in such a dilemma, people respond in various 
ways. Some would directly or indirectly refuse to answer; others would 
directly and straightforwardly say what needs to be said but try at the same 
time to mitigate the negative consequence through linguistic politeness 
(Brown and Levinson, 1987).
Past literature has identified different strategies used in AAC (Bavelas, 
et al. 1990; Galasi㶠ski, 1996, 2000; Ng & Bradac, 1993; Polcar & Jacobs, 1999; 
among others). However, most works are from conversation/discourse 
analytic fields, and the psychological or cognitive mechanism behind the 
message generation in such situations has received very little attention. In 
order to set a groundwork for a full-scale research project on the topic, the 
present article reports results from preliminary and explorative study that 
attempts to identify possible cognitive and communication factors of 
producing messages in avoidance-avoidance situations.
2. Message Production in AAC situations
2.1. Different Types of Messages Available in AAC Situations
Although no exclusive classification criterion has been offered, message 
types in AAC can be classified into several types in terms of relevance to 
conversational demand (Dascal, 1983) and of deceptiveness (Galasi㶠ski, 1996, 
2000). A person caught in the conflict can (a) ostensively satisfy the 
conversational demand either explicitly (e.g., Direct Answer or Direct 
Answer w/ Politeness) or implicitly (e.g., Indirect Answer), (b) ostensively 
refuse to answer either explicitly (Direct Opting Out) or implicitly (Indirect 
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Opting Out), or (c) pretend to satisfy the demand while covertly shifting the 
conversational frame (Covert Evasion) (see Table 1 for the frequently used 
message types and the classifications).
2.2. Uniqueness of Covert Communication
Among the message types, the theoretical attention of the current paper 
is paid to Covert Evasion. Instead of a negative or positive message, a few 
communicators even find an alternative choice, i.e., Covert Evasion, such as 
the following:
(2) A: Did you like the gift?
 B: a.  My wife loves it!
  b.  It’s amazing!
  c.  I appreciate your thoughtfulness.
  d.  Where did you ever find it?
 (Bavelas, et al. 1990, p.59)
Table 1. Message Types Frequently Used in AAC
Message Types
Relevance to the 
Conversational 
Demand
Deceptiveness
Expected
Interpersonal 
Consequence
Classical
Categorization Message Token
Direct Answer, 
Bald + - -
Direct Speech 
Act I just don’ t like it.
Direct Answers, 
with Politeness + - -
Direct Speech 
Act
I’m sorry, but it was 
awful.
Indirect 
Answers + - -
Indirect 
Speech Act You were joking, right?
Lie (White Lie) + + + Falsification I loved it!
Direct Opting 
Out - - + Equivocation No comment.
Indirect Opting 
Out - - + Equivocation
Do we have to talk 
about it?
Covert Evasion Pseud + + + Equivocation Thank you! Where did you get it?
(Bavelas, et al. 1990; Galasi㶠ski, 1996, 2000; Ng & Bradac, 1993; Polcar & Jacobs, 1999:
meta-analyzed, integrated and re-classified by the author of the current paper)
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Covert evasion is a way of escaping the communicative demand by providing 
an apparently cooperative message without generating any clear implicature 
(Polcar & Jacobs, 1998). More specifically, covert evasion is neither 
semantically nor pragmatically relevant to the communicative demands of 
the situation, whereas overt evasion is pragmatically relevant at least on its 
surface (Galasi㶠ski, 2000). Consider the following exchange:
(3) Christine:  I just don’t think the other members of the group like me. 
What do you think?
 Jay:  You know, I’m really sorry you think that. You really shouldn’t 
be concerning yourself with this and you need to work on 
developing more self-confidence.
 (Polcar & Jacobs, 1999)
Jay’s response in (3) is neither opting out of answering the question nor 
indirectly providing a piece of information called for (e.g., whether Jay thinks 
the other members of the group like Christine, or how Jay feels about the 
fact that the members of the group dislike Christine). Semantically, the 
propositional content of the message does not provide required information 
(i.e., “yes” or ”no” ), and therefore irrelevant; pragmatically, it does not 
generate any implicature that can serve as a means to supply the called for 
information, either, and therefore is also irrelevant. As a matter of fact, Jay’s 
message in (3) can be seen as ‘comforting’ or ‘advice.’ When the response 
establishes itself as Covert Evasion, the utterances become a legitimate 
adjacency pair (i.e., Christine now responds to Jay’s ‘comforting’ or ‘advice,’ 
without a further inquiry regarding the originally raised issue)(Levinson, 
1983; Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974; Shegloff, 2007), as can be observed 
in (4):
(4) Christine:  I just don’t think the other members of the group like me. 
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What do you think?
 Jay:  You know, I’m really sorry you think that. You really shouldn’t 
be concerning yourself with this and you need to work on 
developing more self-confidence.
 Christine: You are right. I shouldn’t.
In the conversation, a different and new line of message exchange has been 
initiated, although the partner (i.e., Christine) does not seem to recognize the 
shift. Thus, as Galasi㶠ski (2000) puts it, the senders of covertly evasive 
messages pretend to answer the question, while in fact they manipulate the 
focus of the question. As Tanaka (1999) proposes within a relevance-theoretic 
framework, covert communication is “a case of communication where the 
intention of the speaker is to alter the cognitive environment to the hearer, 
i.e. to make a set of assumptions more manifest to her, without making this 
intention mutually manifest” (p.41). Covert evasion is a typical case of “covert 
communication” in that it attempts to alter the communication domain in 
which communicative interactions are perceived to occur.
2.2. Cognitive Complexity and Communicative Strategies in AAC situations
Covert evasion is a strategic move, or “pragmatic action” (Applegate & 
Sypher, 1996) of a speaker to negotiate communication domains with the 
hearer. Strategic messages in problematic or interpersonally complicated 
communication situations (e.g., regulative, persuasive, comforting, or evasive 
communication) are indexed hierarchically to reflect increasing complexity in 
their designs (Applegate, 1982; Applegate & Sypher, 1996; Clark & Delia, 
1977; Delia & Clark, 1977; O’Keefe, 1990). It is apparent that covert evasion 
has a quite complicated message design, and therefore requires much more 
cognitive effort than direct, straightforward message designs do.
Also, a message produced in AAC can be ranked on a hierarchical scale 
in terms of the degree to which the message can achieve its goal (i.e., to 
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strategically escape the dilemma). Lower level messages are the ones that 
establish explicit relevance in the current context. Such messages include, 
but are not limited to, direct, straightforward answers and indirect answers 
that generate a transparently relevant implicature. Although they satisfy 
conversational demands, they are less likely to solve the conflict. Higher level 
messages most effectively help the speaker escape the avoidance-avoidance 
conflict; they uncooperatively shift the current communicative domain to a 
new, but sufficiently relevant one. Such messages, if investigated carefully, 
which ordinary language users do not often do, neither explicitly (i.e., at the 
level of low-order conversational demand) nor implicitly (i.e., at the level of 
higher-order conversational demand) meet immediate demands of the current 
conversation, but instead assign a different function or attribute some new 
demands to the partner’s utterance (in the case of a question-answer type 
dialogue).
A manipulative message design such as Covert Evasion reflects the 
speaker’s sophisticated recognition of others’ wants, motives, expectations, 
and so forth. This kind of social cognition is partially related to “Theory of 
Mind Mechanism (ToMM)” (Baron-Cohen, 1995): with ToMM, ordinary 
communicators monitor or scan the hearer’s mental state so that the hearer 
will be communicatively, if not emotionally, satisfied with the message. Such 
understanding requires well developed mindreading skills and complex 
cognition of others.
Consequently, a working hypothesis is developed regarding the 
association between one’s interpersonal cognitive complexity level and the 
structure of a message that one produces in avoidance-avoidance conflict 
situations.
H1:   Interpersonal cognitive complexity level would have an impact on the 
individual differences in producing messages in avoidance-avoidance 
conflict situations.
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2.3. Communication Style and Communicative Strategies in AAC situations
In some communicative situations, “goal achievement requires drawing a 
clear separation between subjective and intersubjective relevance, or in 
which it would be helpful to reorganize the communication context” (O’Keefe, 
1990, p.97). The Message Design Logic (MDL) of O’Keefe (1988) offers a 
systematic account for the variation in message designs especially in a 
problematic communication situation such as AAC. O’Keefe (1988, 1990) and 
O’Keefe & McCornack (1987) defined the MDL as implicit theories of 
communication that guide the process of reasoning from goals to messages. 
The model attempts to “describe procedures employed in message 
production, rather than stable structures of motivation and action” (O’Keefe 
& McCarnack, 1987, p.71).
Three premises: O’Keefe (1988) argues that communicators can employ 
any of three different premises about organizing communication and about 
generating/interpreting verbal messages (i.e., Message Design Logic), 
identified as Expressive, Conventional, and Rhetorical logics.
Expressive message design logic (EDL): EDL is based on the premise 
that “language is a medium for expressing thoughts and feelings” (p.84). In 
this sense, there is no distinction between ‘thought’ and ‘expression’ for those 
operating with the logic. Such communicators will give an impression of 
being very literal and direct in message generation/interpretation, because 
“(1) they fail to appreciate that in communication the process of expression 
can be made to serve other goals; and (2) they interpret messages as 
independent units rather than as threads in an interactional fabric, and so 
seem to disregard context” (p.84).
Conventional message design logic (CDL): CMD is based on the premise 
that “communication is a game played cooperatively, according to socially 
conventional rules and procedures” (p.86). In the minds of communicators 
with Conventional logic, ‘thought’ and ‘expression’ are not as directly related 
as in the minds of Expressive communicators; rather, conventional 
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communicators ‘express’ their ‘thought’ by uttering a certain proposition in a 
certain context. That is, messages generated with the Conventional logic 
often count as felicity conditions of speech acts (Searle, 1969, 1979), from 
which the listener can calculate and infer implicature (Grice, 1975). More 
importantly, communicators with CDL consider “rights,” “obligations,” “roles,” 
and “relations” in communication situations as fixed and unchanged variables 
that guide and control appropriate courses of action (O’Keefe, 1988; O’Keefe 
& McCornack, 1987). It may hold that CDL reflects the core premises of the 
Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1975) and the Politeness Principle (Brown & 
Levinson, 1987) in that the primary goal in communication is “appropriate 
contribution” to communicative interactions.
Rhetorical message design logic (RDL): RDL is based on the premise that 
“communication is the creation and negotiation of social selves and situations” 
(O’Keefe, 1988, p.87). Rhetorical message producers seek to achieve or 
manage complex goal sets, in which mutually competing sets of goals coexist 
(i.e., own goals, the others’ goals, intrinsically situation or task relevant goals, 
etc.), by virtue of verbal communication. The relationship between ‘thought’ 
and ‘expression’ does not exist or is at least very slight in the mind of 
Rhetorical message producers, because messages are designed to pursue 
communication goals, but not to merely express their feelings or mental 
states nor to conform to the conventions (i.e., rules, norms, social expectations, 
social roles, etc.). In this sense, their messages are “proactive” rather than 
“reactive,” and are designed “toward effects” rather than “in response to the 
actions of others” (p.88).
MDL in ACC: communicators with EDL do not distinguish between 
issues objectively relevant and those only subjectively relevant, and 
therefore generate messages that directly convey their current mental state 
and assume that others communicate with the same message design logic; 
communicators with CDL recognize intersubjectively relevant issues within 
fixed context parameters (i.e., rights, obligations, roles, social relationships, 
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etc.), and therefore generate messages that are contextually appropriate; 
those with RDL attempt to alter the current communication context, and 
therefore generate messages that portray a new context in which the 
communicators wants can be achieved. Therefore:
H2:   One’s message design logic is associated with the type of messages 
produced in avoidance-avoidance conflict situations.
As O’Keefe (1988, 1990) argues, the two most identifiable global 
properties of EDL are a “lack of editing” and a “failure to engage the 
immediate task” to be accomplished in the situation. Accordingly, in AAC 
situations, EDL would lead communicators to produce messages that either 
(a) directly mediate their thoughts despite potential negative consequences 
so that the message can achieve one goal (i.e., to supply the low-order 
communicative demand) but fail to achieve another (e.g., to avoid socially 
negative consequences, self-face loss, etc.), or (b) completely edit their 
thoughts (i.e., lie) so that the message can avoid potentially negative 
consequences but would violate the most fundamental communication maxim 
(i.e., the maxim of quality). Because expressive communicators are less 
strategic in producing their messages, they may simply choose to bail out of 
the situation without ever committing to the currently on-going 
communication process.
H2a:   Expressive design logic would tend to produce direct, straightforward 
messages or non-responsive answers in avoidance-avoidance conflict 
situations.
Conventional messages show sensitivity to the existing structure of 
rights and obligations in the situation. While avoiding direct, straightforward 
responses to the current communicative demands, communicators with CDL 
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would make their utterances somehow relevant and appropriate in the 
communicative domain. Accordingly, in AAC situations, conventional design 
logic would lead speakers to produce messages that either (a) bluntly opt out 
of the called for response (i.e., providing a motivational account for not 
responding), (b) explicitly opt out of the response with some accounts for the 
‘no-answer’ (e.g., challenge the hearer’s authority to call for the current 
communicative demand, etc.), or (c) implicitly opt out of the response through 
an implicature that counts as a relevant, social account for no-answer.
H2b:   Conventional design logic would produce messages that are overtly 
evasive, but are relevant and appropriate in the current situation. 
Specifically, it would tend to produce opting out or indirect answers in 
avoidance-avoidance conflict situations.
RDL is based on the assumption that communication is the creation and 
negotiation of social situations (O’Keefe, 1988, 1990). Rhetorical messages 
attempt to “reconstitute some important set of features of the situation” 
(O’Keefe, 1990, p.96) so that communicative goals that seem not attainable in 
the original s ituation become attainable .  Accordingly ,  rhetorical 
communicators in avoidance-avoidance conflict situations would produce 
messages that (a) never respond to communicative demands (i.e., never 
establish explicit or implicit relevance), but at the same time (b) covertly 
trigger (i.e., recreate) a new communicative context in which the hearer 
considers the speaker’s utterance relevant and satisfying. The linguistic 
mechanism through which such covert recreation of the situation is achieved 
is to present key features that connect the current and the new, induced 
communicative domains.
H2c:   Rhetorical design logic would produce messages that are covertly 
evasive.
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3. Methods
3.1 Participants and Procedure
A total of 156 undergraduate students (Age: M = 19.72, SD = 1.16; 
Gender: Female n = 115, Male n = 40, Unknown n = 1) participated in the 
study.3） All the participants were from undergraduate courses in 
communication studies at private universities located in the Kansai region, 
Japan. The participants were asked to fill in a series of questionnaire items 
on-line as a part of class assignments; the survey was administered between 
the first and second weeks of each course before the participants were 
exposed to major communication theories.
3.2 Measurements
Message Production in ACC
Message elicitation task:  The participants were presented with a 
hypothetical avoidance-avoidance scenario (i.e., the “gift scenario,” originally 
introduced in Bavelas, et al. (1990)), and were asked to write exactly what 
they would say in the situation. The conflict created in the scenarios was 
between telling the hurtful truth (e.g., “I didn’t like your gift.” ) and making a 
falsification (i.e., “I like the gift.” ), with equivocation being a viable means of 
escape. (See Appendix A for the scenario.)
Multiple choice task:  The participants were presented with another 
AAC scenario (i.e., “Group Member Scenario,” originally used in McCarnack 
(1992)), and then asked to choose one particular message they would use 
from the list of five available options. The message options, employed from 
Polcar and Jacobs (1999), were: (a) White Lie, (b) Direct Opting Out, (c) 
Indirect Opting Out, (d) Indirect Answer, and (e) Covert Evasion. (See 
Appendix B for the exact scenario and message tokens.)
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Cognitive Complexity
Crokett’s (1965) Role Category Questionnaire (RCQ) was used, as the 
questionnaire has been considered a valid assessment of cognitive complexity, 
and, more importantly, as a significant predictor of the level of person-
centered communication. Participants were asked to write descriptions of 
two well-known peers: one they like and the other they dislike. Descriptions 
of peers are scored for construct differentiation (the number of different 
interpersonal constructs they contain), following the modified version of the 
scoring procedures detailed in Crokett (1982). The author and two other 
coders independently scored 30 randomly selected RCQs to establish the 
intercoder reliability (ICC(3, 1): r11 = .99), and then the author coded all of the 
RCQs.
Communication Style (Message Design Logic):
The participants’ Message Design Logics were assessed by the message 
elicitation task (i.e., the “Group Leader task,” originally introduced in O’Keefe 
(1989, 1990)). After reading the Group Leader Problem scenario, the 
participants were asked to write exactly what they would say in the 
situation. Messages generated were classified according to the kind of 
message design logic they embodied with the coding categories and 
exemplary messages given in O’Keefe (1990). The author and the other 
coders independently scored thirty randomly selected messages from the 
sample. They agreed in 86.67% of the cases (i.e., 26 out of 30 cases), which 
gave a value of .79 for kappa, Cohen’s reliability statistic. The author then 
coded all of the messages.
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4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Message Production Patterns
In the solicitation task, there was a clear tendency in the way the 
participants responded in AACs (χ2(5) = 74.93, p < .001): people either lied 
(24.8%), indirectly expressed what needs to be said (28.3%) or tried to evade 
(31.7%); not many directly conveyed the truth or opted out (see Figure 1). No 
interaction effect between Gender and Message Type was found (χ2(5) = 2.48, 
n.s.).
A slightly different pattern was observed in the Multiple Choice task (χ2(4) 
= 48.48, p < .001): although “Lies” “Indirect Answers” and “Cover Evasion” 
were similarly popular, a certain group of the participants chose “Indirectly 
Opting Out” (15.2%) (see Figure 2). Again, there was no interaction effect of 
Gender by Message Type (χ2(4) = 1.98, n.s.).
Notes:  Message Type: χ2(5) = 74.93, p < .001; Gender x Message Type: χ2(5) = 2.48, n.s.
Figure 1. Frequency of Each Message Types in Solicitation Task
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It is worth noting that “Lies (white lies)” was the most common choice in 
the Multiple Choice task. The Situational Theory (Bavelas et al., 1999) 
postulates that lies, even if “white,” would lead to negative consequences (i.e., 
regret, etc.) in AACs, but providing the participants with possible “options” 
may have helped them feel less uncomfortable with the choice by skipping 
the cognitive process of producing a semantically false statement. Also, more 
participants chose to use “Indirect Opting Out” in the Multiple Choice 
condition. Although it remains unclear why the participants changed their 
strategies across the two conditions, the possibility of testing effects needs to 
be carefully considered in the future research design.
4.2 Cognitive Complexity and Message Production
For both solicitation and multiple choice tasks, the analysis of covariance 
(with Gender as a covariance) did not reveal significant main effect of 
Message Type on Cognitive Complexity (Solicitation: F(5, 135) = .83, n.s., η2= .03; 
Multiple Choice: F(4, 136) = 1.86, n.s., η2= .00) or effect of Gender (Solicitation: 
F(1, 135) = .30, n.s., η2= .00; Multiple Choice: F(1, 136) = .39, n.s., η2= .00).
However, those who generated “Indirect Answers” or “Covert Evasion” 
showed slightly higher Cognitive Complexity than those who used 
Notes:  Message Type: χ2(4) = 48.48, p < .001; Gender x Message Type: χ2(4) = 1.98, n.s.
Figure 2. Frequency of Each Message Types in Multiple Choice Task
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“Politeness” or “White lies” (see Figure 3), although statistically significant 
difference was found only between “Lies” and “Covert Evasion” (LSD: p = .03, 
one-tailed).
A similar pattern was found for the Multiple Choice task, where those 
who chose “Indirect Answers” and “Covert Evasion” seemed cognitively 
more complex than those who selected “White Lies” or “Indirect Opting out” 
(see Figure 4): Statistically significant differences were found between 
“Indirect Answers” and “Indirect Opting Out” (LSD: p = .04, two-tailed), and 
between “Indirect Answers” and “Lies” (LSD: p = .03, two-tailed).
Notes: (a) * p < .05 (Post Hoc Comparison, LSD)
(b) (  ) : Frequency of Each Message Type
(c) Error bar: Standard deviations
Figure 3. Mean Cognitive Complexity Scores for Each Message Type (Solicitation)
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Thus, the first hypothesis was only partially supported. The results 
showed that relatively high Interpersonal Cognitive Complexity is required 
to produce Indirect Answers and Covert Evasion in AAC situations, but 
those who used Covert Evasion did not show (at least not statistically 
significantly) a higher level of cognitive complexity than those who used 
Indirect Answers. The possible theoretical explanation may be that the 
participants did not use “Covert Evasion” as a strategic maneuver; the option 
might have been considered simply vague and equivocal, but not strategically 
misleading. The explanation here remains no more than speculation: a careful 
manipulation check on the options (i.e., message tokens) will be necessary for 
the future project to develop a multiple-choice task.
4.3 Communication Style and Message Type
Distribution of MDL and Cognitive Complexity
Before testing the second hypothesis, the distribution of MDLs was 
observed and the result showed a unique pattern among Japanese speakers: 
unlike the findings from studies conducted in the United States (O’Keefe, 
1998), the distribution was rather skewed in that CDL was the most popular 
style. As theoretically predicted, people with different MDLs showed 
Notes: (a) * p < .05 (Post Hoc Comparison, LSD)
(b) (  ) : Frequency of Each Message Type
(c) Error bar: Standard deviations
Figure 4. Mean Cognitive Complexity Scores for Each Message Type (Multiple Choice)
17
18.53
14.23
23.5
15.29
&RYHUW(YDVLRQ
,QGLUHFW$QVZHUV
,QGLUHFW2SWLQJ2XW
'LUHFW2SWLQJ2XW
/LHV:KLWH/LHV
&RJQLWLYH&RPSOH[LW\
* 
*
(51)
(2)
(22)
(33)
(34)
58
different levels of cognitive complexity (F(5, 135) = 9.84, p < .001., η2= .13). Post 
hoc comparisons revealed that those with RDL have higher cognitive 
complexity than those with the other two styles, and those with CDL have 
higher cognitive complexity than those with EDL (see Figure 5).
MDL and Message Choices
Hypothesis two (i.e., the overall association of MDL and Message Choice) 
was not supported (Solicitation task: χ2(10) = 6.20, n.s.; Multiple Choice task: χ2(8) 
= 11.56, n.s). In both the solicitation and multiple-choice tasks, “White Lies,” 
“Indirect Answers” and “Covert Evasion” were rather equally distributed in 
each MDL group (see Figures 6 and 7).
Notes: (a) * p < .05, ** p<.001 (Post Hoc Comparison, LSD).
(b) (  ) : Frequency of Each Message Type
(c) Error bar: Standard deviations
Figure 5. Mean Cognitive Complexity Scores for Each MDL
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Note: Overall difference (Message Type by MDL): χ2(10) = 6.20, n.s.
Figure 6. Frequency of Message Type by MDL (Solicitation Task)
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Figure 7. Frequency of Message Type by MDL (Multiple Choice)
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None of the patterns that seemingly conform to the predictions (i.e., the 
relatively large number of (a) Covert Evasion for RDL, (b) While Lies for 
EDL, and (c) Indirect Answers for CDL) was statistically significant, partially 
due to the small sample size of each message token (especially for the RDL 
group), and therefore no further discussion can be made from the results. 
However, it still is worth pointing out that “While Lies” (as well as “Indirect 
Answers” and “Covert Evasion”) was constantly a favored choice among 
Japanese speakers regardless of their MDLs. As many intercultural 
communication researchers have suggested, communication traits among 
Japanese such as collectivism (Triandis, 1995), high-context communication 
style (Hofstede, 1991), and interdependent self-construal (Markas & Kitayama, 
1991) could override their individual communication style (i.e., MDL) in 
message production.
4. Conclusion
The current work revealed some preliminary findings about Japanese 
speakers’ communicative strategies in AAC situations. First, a unique pattern 
in the distribution of MDLs among Japanese speakers was found. Only a 
small portion of the sample showed a tendency toward RDL. This may imply 
that Japanese speakers may be overwhelmingly Conventional in message 
choices, which may result in the complicated results in terms of producing 
Covert Messages. Second, instead of going covertly evasive, most participants 
chose to be polite and sacrifice their honesty ( “White Lies” ), or tried to 
mitigate the negative consequence ( “Direct Answers w/ Politeness” and 
“Indirect Answers” ). Some of course tried to escape AAC by Covert 
Evasion, but cognitively more complex Japanese speakers do not necessarily 
pursue that goal, against the working Hypothesis. This may suggest that 
Japanese speakers are sensitive to the uncooperativeness of Covert Evasion 
and therefore avoid the strategy. This may account for the third finding that 
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individual communication style (i.e., MDL) did not predict their behaviors in 
AAC situations. (see Figure 8 for the overall model tested in the study)
Notes
１）Part of the work was presented at the third American Association of Pragmatics 
2016 (Koyama, 2016).
２）This work was partially supported by MEXT/JSPS KAKENHI (Grant-in-Aid for 
Scientific Research (C): Grant Number 17K02701).
３）This research analyzed data collected through in-class activities/assignments of 
university undergraduate courses taught by the author during 2013 and 2016. All the 
participants consented to the use and reuse of anonymized data for future research 
and academic purposes outside the courses.
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Appendix A
Message Production Task Scenarios & Message Types
Solicitation Task (Gift scenario)
You have received a gift from someone you really like a lot and are very 
close to, but the gift is awful, and you don’t like it at all. The person now 
says to you, “Did you like the gift?” Please write down in the space below 
exactly what you would say in this situation to the person.
Multiple Choice Task (Group member scenario)
You are taking a class in which a major group task is assigned. During 
the semester, one of the group members whom you know quite well says 
to you, “I just don’t think the other members of the group like me. What 
do you think?” As a matter of fact, you know that the other members 
indeed do not like the person. However, you also know how sensitive 
this person is to interpersonal-relationship issues and can easily imagine 
how much it would hurt when the person finds out the fact that the 
other members do not like the person. Please write down in the space 
below exactly what you would say in this situation to the person.
(a) White Lies: I don’t think they don’t like you.
(b) Direct Opting Out: Come on, let’s talk about something else.
(c) Indirect Opting Out: I don’t think I should speak for others.
(d) Indirect Answers:  I think you should face the reality. Not everybody 
likes everybody.
(e) Covert Evasion:  You know, I am really sorry you think that. You 
really shouldn’t be concerning yourself with this 
and you need to work on developing more self-
confidence.
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Appendix B
Table 1. Frequency of each Message Types (Solicitation / Multiple Choice)
Solicitation Multiple Choice
Female Male Total Female Male Total
1. Direct Answers: Bald 1(0.9%)
1
(2.6%)
2
(1.4%)
NA
2. Direct Answers:
w/ Politeness
8
(7.5%)
5
(13.2%)
13
(9.0%)
3. Lies (White Lies) 29(27.1%)
7
(18.4%)
36
(24.8%)
37
(34.6%)
16
(42.1%)
53
(36.7%)
4. Direct Opting Out 0 0 0 1(0.9%)
1
(2.6%)
2
(1.4%)
5. Indirect Opting Out 5(4.7%)
2
(5.3%)
7
(4.8%)
18
(16.8%)
4
(10.5%)
22
(15.2%)
6. Indirect Answers 30(28.0%)
11
(28.9%)
41
(28.3%)
24
(22.4%)
9
(23.7%)
33
(22.8%)
7. Covert Evasion 34(31.8%)
12
(31.6%)
46
(31.7%)
27
(25.2%)
8
(21.1%)
35
(24.1%)
Total 107(100%)
38
(100%)
145
(100%)
107
(100%)
38
(100%)
145
(100%)
Notes:
Solicitation Message Type: χ2(5) = 74.93, p < .001; Gender x Message Type: χ2(5) = 2.48, n.s.
Multiple Choice Message Type: χ2(4) = 48.48, p < .001; Gender x Message Type: χ2(4) = 1.98, n.s.
Table 2.  Means and Standard Deviations of Cognitive Complexity for each Message 
Types (Solicitation / Multiple Choice)
Solicitation Multiple Choice
n M SD n M SD
1. Direct Answers: Bald 2 18.0 5.66
2. Direct Answers:
w/ Politeness
12 15.08 7.20
3. Lies (White Lies) 35 14.80 5.89 51 15.29 7.44
4. Direct Opting Out 0 - - 2 23.50 7.68
5. Indirect Opting Out 7 14.43 5.29 22 14.23 6.60
6. Indirect Answers 40 16.73 9.11 33 18.52 9.12
7. Covert Evasion 46 17.87 9.11 34 17.00 6.35
Total 142 16.40 7.73 142 16.40 7.73
Notes:
Solicitation Message Type: F(5, 135) = .83, n.s., η2= .03; Gender (covariance):  F(1, 135) = .30, n.s., η2= .00
Multiple Choice: Message Type:  F(4, 136) = 1.86, n.s., η2= .05; Gender (covariance):  F(1, 136) = .39, n.s., η2= .00
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